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Introduction
THE IMPACT OF TEACHING PROCEDURE
JANET WALKER *
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES the teaching of procedure make? How does the way

law schools approach the teaching of procedure affect the other subjects taught
in the basic curriculum? How does it affect the general understanding of the role
of legal education and the way it should be pursued? How does the approach
taken to teaching procedure affect legal scholarship, and how does this affect the
community of academics specializing in the area and the way they enhance the
general understanding the law of procedure? What impact does the teaching of
procedure have on the practice of law and the approach to dispute resolution taken
by members of the profession? And what role does it play in civil justice reform?
These are the questions considered in this collection of articles. The approach
taken to the teaching of procedure in common law countries is a product of a long
history—one that has rarely been the subject of reflection, and then only for discrete
reasons relating to curriculum reform or reviewing professional qualifications.1
When this has occurred, these questions have usually been considered from within
a legal system in which the fundamental approach to teaching procedure has not
been regarded as in need of review. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult
for participants to imagine how things could be different in any significant way. It
would be difficult, therefore, to appreciate what difference it might make to legal
education, legal scholarship, the practice and profession of law, and civil justice
reform in each legal system if the existing approach were fundamentally different.
*
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However, when these questions are considered in a comparative context,
the insights that emerge are quite remarkable. The approach to the teaching of
procedure has developed in significantly different ways from one common law
system to another. The distinctiveness of the approaches taken in the United
States, Canada, Australia, and England and Wales to teaching procedure stand in
marked contrast to other features of these legal systems in which the approaches
taken are quite similar. By comparing the way in which procedure is taught
across these common law systems and then by observing the distinctive features
of legal education, legal scholarship, the practice of law and the organization
of the profession, and civil justice reform in these legal systems, it is possible to
trace a link between the way procedure is taught (or not) and these other aspects
of the life of the law.
The fact that the approach to teaching procedure has remained relatively
constant in these legal systems over the years, and that only rarely has it been the
subject of reflection and critique might suggest that a comparative project such
as this is likely to be purely of academic interest. If things have not changed in
the past, these musings are likely to serve only to satisfy the idle curiosity of
specialists in the field. However, times are changing. Globalization and the
increased interaction between lawyers and legal systems is prompting a review
of the relationship between legal education and the qualifications required for
admission to the profession. Advances in information technology are changing
the way in which disputes are resolved and the approach that is taken to questions
of access to justice.
There are signs in all four countries that the continuum of legal education,
legal scholarship, legal practice, and civil justice reform is changing. There are also
signs that important decisions about the nature of the legal community and the
role of its members—students, scholars, practitioners, and jurists—are at hand. In
the United States, where each of more than two hundred law schools is required
to teach a compulsory civil procedure course to every law student, there exists a
dynamic community of proceduralists with an impressively broad and diverse
academic interest in the subject. By contrast, in Canada, despite a long history of
treating procedure as a required subject, the Federation of Law Societies’ newly
established standards for the common law degree have raised questions about the
place of procedure in the prescribed curriculum.2 In Australia also, at a time when
2.
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academic interest in civil procedure is growing, there have been informal suggestions
that civil procedure should be removed from the core curriculum to make space
for emerging areas of legal practice. And in England and Wales, major inquiries
into civil justice reform—first, the Woolf Report, and more recently, the Jackson
Report—together with major reforms to the profession under the Legal Services
Act,3 also raise significant questions about the links between the way procedure is
taught and the way in which civil justice reform is conducted.
In addition to the important practical implications of these questions for legal
education, legal scholarship, legal practice, and civil justice reform, there are important
theoretical insights to be gained by exploring the link between the decision to include a
subject in a university program and the advancement and dissemination of knowledge
in the area. What makes a subject worth teaching and learning as a distinct and cohesive
body of knowledge or series of issues? How does treating a subject such as procedure as
a distinct and cohesive academic subject affect the rest of the law school curriculum?
How does the approach taken foster or impede the development of a community of
scholars specializing in the subject—scholars who may, in turn, become stewards of
the field? And more broadly, what difference does the way we approach the teaching
of particular subjects make to our understanding of the law as a whole?

The Project on Teaching Procedure
In 2010 the Leverhulme Trust sponsored a visiting professorship at Oxford to
explore the possibility of introducing procedure as a subject in the legal curriculum
of England and Wales. Reflecting on the prospect of introducing a new subject to the
curriculum raised a range of fundamental questions. The idea that a well-established
academic subject in some common law systems might not exist at all in others is a
fascinating question in and of itself. And to meet the challenge of imagining ways
in which it might be introduced into the curriculum, it would be necessary to
understand how, and why, the subject could thrive in some legal systems and not
exist at all in others.
Because procedure would be a new subject, if it were to be introduced in
England and Wales, it would require more than simply hiring instructors and
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Approved Common Law Degree (November 2008) at 6.
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ordering course materials as would be the case for a well-established subject for
which the instructor in a particular law school had gone on sabbatical or retired.
In fact, the prospect of introducing a new subject to the law school curriculum
would present, in some ways, a more complex challenge even than staffing and
organizing the entire teaching program for a new law school in which the subjects
to be taught were well established. After all, who would be qualified to teach the
subject? There would be no tradition of discussion and debate on core issues
and principles. There would be no corpus of literature and source for teaching
materials. There would be no precedents for approaches to subject-specific course
structures or teaching methods. And there would be no precedents for methods
of evaluation. Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail in the articles in
this collection, if the subject is different from the other, substantive law subjects,
it would not be possible simply to adapt by analogy methods and materials
developed for those subjects.
In the absence of a strong local tradition of teaching the subject, the possibility
of introducing the subject could only be imagined with the support of a community
of specialists from other similar legal systems. For the visiting professorship, garnering
such support generated a fascinating challenge and opportunity because the scholarly
community of proceduralists in the common law world outside the United States
is remarkably small. This is in sharp contrast with the civil law world, where annual
meetings of national associations of procedural law attract hundreds of participants,
publications of every shape and size proliferate, and festschrifts to leading figures abound.
In England and Wales, a few towering figures4 have toiled largely alone in the field. In
Canada, an effort to secure the involvement of all the available scholars specializing,
at least in part, in procedure in the preparation of a national casebook resulted in the
participation of less than a dozen co-authors.5 And in Australia, up until the last decade,
there were very few full-time legal academics interested in civil procedure.6
Indeed, the struggle in the common law world, at least outside the United
States, to sustain engaged communities of procedural scholars is illustrated by the
composition of the membership in the International Association of Procedural
4.
5.
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Dr. Bernard Cairns has been the doyen of Australian civil procedure academics since the
1980s.
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Law (IAPL), the principal international organization in the field. While the IAPL
members from the common law legal systems outside the United States represent
a far greater proportion of the procedural specialists within their own countries
than do the members from the United States and the Civil Law Countries, the
IAPL members from the common law systems outside the United States represent
only a very small proportion of the membership of the IAPL. In other words,
despite the over-representation of common law proceduralists relative to
their local communities, they constitute a relatively small proportion of the
membership of the IAPL.
Accordingly, the occasion to reflect in a comparative way on the teaching of
procedure in common law systems proved to be an ideal opportunity for common
lawyers specializing in procedure to exchange ideas and foster collegial engagement
among scholars who otherwise often worked in relative isolation. In this way, the
Project on Teaching Procedure was formed to foster collaboration among common law
proceduralists and to promote discussion of issues of common concern in their field.
One early initiative of this informal group was to convene a workshop at
Herstmonceux Castel in Sussex, England in the summer of 2010 to explore the
teaching of procedure in comparative context. The Herstmonceux Workshop
participants included Professor Adrian Zuckerman, Mr. Andrew Higgins, Dr. Carla
Crifò, Dr. Shirley Shipman, Dr. Dierdre Dwyer, and Mr. Winky So from England;
Dean David Bamford and Professor Camille Cameron from Australia; Professors
Tom Rowe and Beth Thornburg from the United States; Professor Michael
Karayanni and Dr. Rabeea Assy from Israel; and Professors Garry Watson, Trevor
Farrow, Erik Knutsen, and Janet Walker from Canada. As a result of the generous
support of the Leverhulme Trust, the Harry Arthurs Collaborative Research Fund
of Osgoode Hall Law School, Queen’s University Faculty of Law, and Oxford
University Faculty of Law, the participants were able to meet and discuss a series
of papers that were ultimately developed into this collection of articles.
The workshop participants were confronted with a range of very elementary
questions. One such question was: What do we mean by procedure? In discussing
the various possible names for the subject, the one thing on which all readily agreed
was that no single name adequately captured the precise scope and contours of
the subject. Despite this, everyone seemed relatively comfortable with a series of
defining features that suggest a common core of topics and interests and a range
of cognate subjects that collectively describe the field.
First, the primary focus of the subject was on the process of resolving civil
disputes and to a lesser extent on the process of determining criminal matters
or matters in specialized administrative tribunals. Some of us also specialize in
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these other public law subjects. However, the special rights of accused persons in
criminal law matters and the specialized procedures in administrative tribunals
distinguish those situations from the resolution of private law matters in ways that
were sufficiently fundamental to make civil procedure a separate subject. Therefore,
although the term “procedure” is often used without the adjective “civil” in this
special issue, it is intended to denote civil procedure unless otherwise specified.
Second, the primary focus is on the pre-trial phase and to a lesser extent on
the trial phase of a civil dispute. Again, some of the participants also specialized
in trial process and evidence. At least historically, it has been the pre-trial phase
(and, in some countries, the pre-action phase) that is in the hands of parties and
their lawyers in the common law. While the parties and their lawyers also take
an active role in the trial phase, and judges are increasingly becoming involved
in the pre-trial phase, the nature of their roles and responsibilities is sufficiently
different in these two phases to warrant distinguishing them from one another
as different subjects.
Third, the primary focus is on the process of resolving disputes through litigation,
and to a lesser extent on other means of resolving civil disputes, such as negotiation,
mediation, and arbitration. Some of the participants also specialize in one or more
of these other forms of dispute resolution, which were once described as alternative
dispute resolution. Today, litigation is rarely used on its own to resolve disputes,
and civil disputes are often resolved long before the trial phase is reached by lawyers
through these other means.
For some, this shift in emphasis suggests that the study of litigation should
be replaced by the study of other forms of civil dispute resolution. The Workshop
participants disagreed. The increased prominence of other forms of dispute
resolution does not mean that these forms should compete with one another in
the curriculum, or that the study of the litigation process has become redundant.
On the contrary, the various forms of dispute resolution complement one another.
While these other forms of dispute resolution may be rapidly becoming a first
resort, they are often described as “bargaining in the shadow of the law.”7 As the
traditional means of state-sponsored dispute resolution, civil litigation remains
the last resort for aggrieved parties who wish to vindicate their rights. Accordingly,
it may be said that a good grounding in the civil litigation process is essential to
understanding the rationale and merit of other means of dispute resolution, and
when and how they are best pursued.
7.

A phrase originally coined by Mnookin and Kornhauser in Robert H Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce” (1979) 88:5 Yale
LJ 950.

INTRODUCTION

vii

Fourth, the primary focus is on the legal principles governing the process of
civil litigation, or “the law” of dispute resolution, and to a lesser extent the related
subjects, such as advocacy, professional responsibility, and the administration of
justice, which address the process from a different perspective. These too were
additional areas of specialization for some of the Workshop participants. In
studying the broader impact of the teaching of procedure in this collection of
articles, the authors are engaged in a study that could be said to fall in this broader
set of interests, but in speaking of “teaching procedure,” we mean the teaching of
the legal principles governing the civil litigation process.
Fifth, the primary focus is on procedure in common law systems. Some of
the Workshop participants also specialize in comparative procedure, and the study
of procedure is undoubtedly enriched by understanding its principles in their
historical and comparative contexts across the divide between common law and
civil law systems. However, the distinctions between procedure in common law
and civil law systems are sufficiently fundamental to warrant limiting comparative
analysis in these articles to common law systems.
It is helpful to describe the subject in terms of its primary focus and the range
of cognate subjects that are related to it. While it is possible to distinguish the
core of the subject from related subjects, if it were taught in isolation from these
other subjects, procedure would become arid and technical. In fact, it is difficult
to imagine teaching the subject if it were removed entirely from the context that
these other subjects provide. Furthermore, while there may be a common core to
the subject across common law systems, for reasons explored in the papers in this
collection, there are subtle differences in the way that the subject is understood
from country to country.
Nevertheless, these variations make settling on a single accurate name for the
subject all but impossible. “Civil procedure” is a good name because it clarifies
that the issues are those that arise in the resolution of civil rather than criminal
proceedings. However, to some it suggests a subject that excludes consideration
of forms of dispute resolution other than litigation, and in some places this would
not be accurate. Using the terms “dispute resolution” or “civil dispute resolution”
would address this concern, but at the expense of the controversy this would
create for those who would integrate other cognate subjects but who would not
include so-called “alternative” dispute resolution in their version of the subject.
“Civil justice” is also a good name because it suggests that civil procedure is
set in its broader institutional context, but again, the suggested emphasis on
this particular context would come at the expense of the suggested inclusion of
another context. Similarly, “the civil litigation process” might suggest to some
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the inclusion of the professional context, but perhaps the exclusion of some
other cognate subjects.
Although there may be no single accurate name, adopting the simple term
“procedure” could prove to be a good solution. While it is a term that is rarely used
on its own among common law lawyers, it is well established in the civil law with
a significant proportion of legal academics claiming it as their subject. And, for
a subject that is robust and well-established in some common law countries, and
nascent, marginalized, or very much in flux in others, the simple term “procedure”
could serve to encourage those who want to call this subject their own and who
would welcome the easy recognition enjoyed by their civilian counterparts upon
describing themselves as “proceduralists.”
Another preliminary question is what is meant by a “proceduralist.” The
obvious answer is that it is someone who specializes in procedure, but the
question arises because procedure is not always taught by full-time academics, let
alone those specializing only in procedure. Also, in some countries there may be
so few specialists that it is not possible to identify a community of proceduralists.
To the extent that the teaching of procedure by proceduralists and the presence
of a community of proceduralists could have an impact on the legal profession
and on civil justice reform, it will be helpful to consider the defining features of
specialists in procedure or proceduralists.
Someone who teaches procedure and who engages in scholarship in the area,
and possibly law reform, is clearly a proceduralist. However, not many of those
who teach procedure would meet these criteria. In some places procedure is taught
by full-time academics who do not consider themselves specialists in the subject;
in other places procedure is taught by practitioners who teach only part-time. In
some places it is common for academics teaching law to have an active practice;
in others, it is common for many full-time law teachers not to engage regularly
in scholarship or graduate supervision. The variations from legal system to legal
system, from place to place within a legal system, and even from person to person
within a law school, can make it difficult to determine who is a proceduralist merely
by noting their pattern of activities.
Accordingly, it could be better to take a functional approach: A proceduralist
is a person with a sustained interest in civil procedure and related subjects, who
is actively engaged in the development of the subject. Of course this will include
those who regularly teach and publish in the field. However, in some cases it will
also include those who do not publish, or who do not publish in the field of
procedure, but who teach the subject in a way that contributes to its ongoing
renewal and revitalization. In other cases, it could also include those who do not
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currently teach procedure, but who are active as scholars or who are engaged in
law reform in the area. And in some places, the question of who is a proceduralist
may be affected by the expectations for law teachers and legal academics more
generally, and should be measured against those expectations.
The question of degree of engagement in the field necessary to be considered a
specialist may vary even more from one place to another. It may be more difficult
to demonstrate significant leadership in the field in a legal system in which the
field is active and well developed and equally, it may be more difficult to make a
contribution to the development of the field at all where there is little academic
engagement and the field is underdeveloped. Both of these challenges suggest that
deciding what should count as a contribution sufficient to distinguish someone
as a specialist in the field can be highly context-specific.
With these variations in mind, it was particularly effective to have participants
at the Workshop who represented not only a diverse cross-section of the common
law systems and their various perspectives on teaching procedure, but also the full
spectrum of levels of experience, including those at the peak of the field such as
Professors Rowe, Watson and Zuckerman and those just completing their doctoral
studies and beginning to establish themselves as specialists in procedural law. Of
the many lively debates and discussions on the wide range of issues considered,
the participants were unanimous in their view on one point: The opportunity to
collaborate across legal systems and generations was critical to the development of
a strong tradition of scholarship in the field. The hope is that the Herstmonceux
Workshop and this collection of articles will encourage others to join in the
work begun by the Project on Teaching Procedure and, in this way, carry on the
tradition of the great proceduralists of our time.

Tribute to a Great Proceduralist
The recent retirement of Garry D. Watson from Osgoode Hall Law School brought
with it the welcome opportunity to reflect on a truly extraordinary career. Born
in Australia, Professor Watson emigrated after completing his first law degree
there, pausing en route to Toronto—first, to teach as a legal writing fellow at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and then, to complete an LL.M. at Yale.
Perhaps as a result of his Australian background and his time at Penn and Yale,
Professor Watson arrived in Canada with a broad international outlook ready to
foster the very best in the teaching of procedural law. Eschewing artificial distinctions
between theory and practice, he built an academic career that shaped the field in
Canada and informed the profession of the era. Generations of lawyers developed
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a critical approach to the subject through the casebook on civil procedure that he
began with Stephen Borins (later Justice Borins of the Ontario Court of Appeal)
and Neil Williams in 1973. The casebook is currently in its seventh edition, with
a dozen authors from across the country. Thousands of practitioners honed their
skills in the Intensive Trial Advocacy Workshop, an annual eight-day program that
he founded in 1979; and similar numbers of third-year law students benefitted
from the Trial Practice Seminar, a law school course modelled on the Workshop. In
the last decade of his career, his pioneering seminar on class actions advanced the
understanding of that field, and his series of symposia on class actions at Osgoode
Professional Development stimulated new thought among leading figures from
the bench, bar, and academy.
Spending his years of sabbatical leave in major Toronto law firms ensured
that he could talk the talk and walk the walk. As a result, his writings became a
primary source of guidance in civil procedure to countless practitioners over the
years. His annually published annotation of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Watson
& McGowan, and his looseleaf commentary, Holmested & Watson, are standard
reference works. His leading articles continue to be consulted many, many years
after their publication. His contributions to the work of the Ontario Law Reform
Commission, the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, the rules
committees of several provinces, the American Law Institute, and the International
Association of Procedural Law are the hallmark of the best that can be achieved by
applying the combined insights of the academic and the practitioner to the most
challenging questions of civil justice reform.
So much more could be said. As a teacher, a colleague, and a mentor to lawyers
of all stages in their careers, Garry Watson became truly larger than life. A model
of passionate engagement, his terse interjections have sharpened the debate just as
frequently as his hearty laughter has warmed the room. His frank but remarkably astute
criticism was unfailingly coupled with genuine admiration for real achievement so that
he has merited, and received, the respect and affection of an extraordinary range of the
most accomplished members of the legal community.
To those who have known him and worked with him, it is gratifying to know that
Professor Watson’s extensive contributions to the profession did not go unrecognized.
Professor Watson was one of the few full-time academics ever to be named Queen’s
Counsel. The Law Society Medal (1992) and the David Mundell Medal for outstanding
contribution to the law through legal writing by the Ontario Bar Association (2005) are
testaments to the high esteem in which he has been held by members of the profession
in Ontario. And the Samuel E. Gates Litigation Award (2004), which is given by the
American College of Trial Lawyers only in years when a deserving recipient is found,
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and which is usually reserved for a judge or a practising lawyer, is a fitting tribute to
one of the great proceduralists of our time.
As for his contributions to the legal academy and to Osgoode, a well-deserved
teaching award and this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal are but
small tokens of the sincere regard for him felt by those of us who have been his
students, colleagues, and friends. In many respects, it is Professor Watson who is to
be thanked for the fact that law students and academics in Canada and elsewhere
in the common law world enjoy a rich and multi-faceted curriculum and a lively
scholarly community animated by discussions and areas of scholarly inquiry that
will continue to be inspired by his work for many years to come. It is with this in
mind that we offer this volume in tribute to Professor Garry D. Watson.

